

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13

ACDA-07 SAJ-01 TRSE-00 /080 W

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P R 131045Z NOV 76

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8680

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMCONSUL ZAGREB

USMISSION USUN

USMISSION NATO

CINCSOUTH NAPLES

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 7353

CINCEUR AND CINCSOUTH FOR POLADS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR YO UR

SUBJ: BREZHNEV VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA

REF: (A) BELGRADE 7212 (NOTAL), (B) BELGRADE 7303 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: LITTLE HAS EMERGED TO INDICATE WHAT TOPICS

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TITO-BREZHNEV DISCUSSIONS WILL CENTER AROUND. MOST SIGNI-

FICANT ISSUES APPEAR TO BE: LCY-CPSU RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY
CONTENTION OVER "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM"; TREATMENT OF
NONALIGNMENT; SOVIET NAVAL ACCESS TO ADRIATIC PORTS;
ECONOMIC CONCERNS. AND PERENNIAL YUGOSLAV DESIRE
FOR SOVIET ASSURANCES ON NON-INTERVENTION, 1955 BELGRADE
DECLARATION, ETC. ALL STRENGTHENED ANEW BY GOY PUBLIC COMMENT
ON PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER'S PRE-ELECTION REMARKS RE
"HYPOTHETICAL" SOVIET INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA. END SUMMARY.

2. DESPITE THE POSITIVE TONE OF THE FEW PRESS PIECES WE
HAVE SEEN THUS FAR, ALL HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY HAR-
MONIOUS REGARDING THE BREZHNEV VISIT. BRITISH COUNSELOR
TOLD POL COUNS BRITS HAD LEARNED DURING FONMIN
CROSLAND'S VISIT HERE THAT SOVIETS HAD DAYS BEFORE SUBMITTED
DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WHICH YUGOSLAVS FOUND "COMPLETELY
UNACCEPTABLE." NUMBER OF ISSUES EXIST WHICH SEPARATE
THE TWO.

3. "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" AND SOVIET PRESS
CONTINUED TREATMENT THEREOF HAVE BEEN SUBJECT OF CON-
SIDERABLE PRESS CRITICISM IN YUGOSLAVIA. DIFFERENCE OF
COURSE IS FUNDAMENTAL AND MOVEMENT OF ONE SIDE TO ACCEPTING
THE POSITION OF THE OTHER WOULD BE MAJOR VICTOR FOR LATTER
SIDE. YUGOSLAVS CERTAINLY WILL BE SEEKING SOVIET ACKNOW-
LEDGEMENT OF SOME FORM OF ECPC FORMULATION RECOGNIZING
THE ACCEPTABILITY OF "DIFFERENT ROADS TO SOCIALISM."
SOVIETS ON OTHER HAND HAVE COMPLAINED THAT YUGOSLAV PRESS
HAS NOT BEEN KEEPING TO A 1971 AGREEMENT WHICH CALLED FOR
A CESSATION OF PRESS CRITICISM.

4. YUGOSLAVS HAVE NOT BEEN PLEASED WITH SOVIET AND EAST
EUROPEAN (EXCEPT FOR ROMANIA) TREATMENT OF NONALIGNMENT.
YUGOSLAVS ESPECIALLY TAKE ISSUE WITH SOVIET/EE PERSISTENCE
THAT IMPORTANCE OF NONALIGNMENT IS CONDITIONED ON ITS
COOPERATION WITH "SOCIALISM." YUGOSLAVS, ADDITIONALLY,
WERE UPSET WITH ACCOUNTS OF THE COLOMBO NAC WHICH
INCLUDED LISTS OF THE "MOST PROGRESSIVE" NA NATIONS
OMITTING YUGOSLAVIA.

5. QUESTION OF SOVIET DESIRES FOR INCREASED NAVAL ACCESS
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TO YUGOSLAV ADRIATIC PORTS HAS BEEN WITH US SINCE THE
EGYPTIANS ASKED THE SOVIETS TO LEAVE ALEXANDRIA. DURING
A TALK ON THE BREZHNEV VISIT WITH A LOCALLY-BASED
ITALIAN CORRESPONDENT, FORMER "NARODNA ARMIJA" AND "FRONT"
EDITOR SIME KRONJA STATED UNSOLICITEDLY, "OF COURSE
BREZHNEV WILL SPEAK OF AND WILL PRESSURE US FOR MORE NAVAL
FACILITIES. BUT WE UNDERSTAND THEIR PROBLEM IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN." KRONJA'S COMMENTS WERE MEANT FOR PUBLI-

CATION BUT WHETHER TO PREPARE THE PUBLIC FOR SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE SOVIETS OR TO START A BACKFIRE AGAINST CONCESSIONS IS UNCLEAR.

6. WE CANNOT GAUGE WHETHER ANYTHING MAJOR WILL DEVELOP FROM THE VISIT IN THE ECONOMIC REALM THOUGH WE UNDERSTAND YUGOSLAVS WILL PUSH FOR GREATER SOVIET IMPORTS OF THEIR GOODS. THE SOVIET UNION SUPPLIES YUGOSLAVIA WITH ROUGHLY 27 PERCENT OF ITS PETROLEUM NEEDS. CLEARLY THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN THIS FLOW. HOWEVER, INASMUCH AS THEY PAY WORLD (VICE THE LOWER CEMA) PRICES FOR THE SOVIET PETROLEUM, IT IS UNLIKELY THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD WANT TO INCREASE THE PRESENT LEVEL AS LONG AS OTHER SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE. WHILE THE USSR HAS BECOME YUGOSLAVIA'S NUMBER ONE TRADING PARTNER, THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE BEEN SLOW IN PICKING UP THE CREDITS MOST RECENTLY OFFERED BY THE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8681

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SOVIETS. AND WE KNOW OF NOTHING THE YUGOSLAVS CAN PRODUCE
THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT GET DOMESTICALLY OR JUST AS
EASILY ELSEWHERE.

7. GOY PUBLIC STATEMENT ON PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER'S PRE-LECTION
ANSWER TO "HYPOTHETICAL" QUESTION REGARDING SOVIET INVASION OF
YUGOSLAVIA MAY HAVE MADE THIS ISSUE ONE WHICH UNAVOIDABLY
WOULD HAVE TO BE RAISED. HOWEVER, YUGOSLAV PRESS RESPONDED
POSITIVELY TO CARTER'S POST-ELECTION RESPONSE AND NOTHING
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HAS BEEN WRITTEN FOR SEVERAL DAYS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE
YUGOSLAVS WILL NOT SEEK SOME WAY TO OBTAIN SOVIET ASSURANCES
ON THIS MATTER--IT IS ALWAYS THEIR NUMBER ONE REQUEST OF
SOVIETS AND LIES AT ROOT OF DEMANDS FOR REFERENCES TO 1955
BELGRADE DECLARATION. TANJUG EDITOR GAVRILOVIC STRESSED THIS POINT
WITH CHARGE' RECENTLY.

8. FSFA SPOKESMAN KALEZIC AT HIS NOV 11 PRESS BRIEFING
"UNOFFICIALLY" STATED THAT GOY ATTACHES "GREAT
IMPORTANCE" TO THE NOV 15-17 BREZHNEV VISIT. BILATERAL
RELATIONS "HAVE BEEN ON THE ASCENT FOR MANY YEARS
IN ALL SPHERES, PARTICULARLY IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION."
HE ADDED THAT THE "SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT" OF LCY-CPSU
COOPERATIONS WILL RECEIVE A "SPECIAL PLACE" IN THE TALKS.
THE INTERNATIONAL MATTERS KALEZIC MENTIONED FOR DISCUSSION
WILL BE CSCE, COLOMBO NAC, ECPC AND "CONTEMPORARY TRENDS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS MOVEMENT."

9. SINCE THE ORIGINAL ANNOUNCEMENT PUBLISHED NOV 2
YUGOSLAV MEDIA HAS CARRIED VERY LITTLE ON THE VISIT.
ALL NOV 12 DAILIES CARRY KALEZIC'S COMMENTS. BUT
ONLY COMMENTARIES THUS FAR HAVE BEEN FROM POLITIKA'S
MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT BAJALSKI ON NOV 3 (SEE REF A)
AND NIN'S FOREIGN EDITOR MIODRAG MAROVIC IN EDITION ISSUED
NOV 12 (MAROVIC IS THOROUGHLY DISLIKED BY SOVIETS
HERE, AN EMOTION HE RETURNS WITH GUSTO). AS LATE AS
NOV 5 BOTH BORBA AND POLITIKA HAD ARTICLES FROM
MOSCOW CONTAINING VEILED CRITICISM OF RECENT SOVIET
ARTICLES: BORBA ON A "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" PIECE ON "THE
INDESTRUCTIBLE ALLIANCE, UNITY, AND MONOLITHISM OF THE
SOCIALIST COMMUNITY; AND POLITIKA ON AN "IZVESTIYA"
ARTICLE ON FOREIGN POLICY "COORDINATION" OF "SOCIALIST"

COUNTRIES.

10. WHILE OVER THE WEEKEND THE YUGOSLAV PRESS PROBABLY WILL BE DOING MORE, WE RECALL THAT FOR DAYS PRIOR TO CEAUSESCU'S RECENT STAY IN YUGOSLAVIA, THE LOCAL PRESS CARRIED MANY PIECES OF DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF YUGOSLAV-ROMANIAN RELATIONS . (THE BRITS HERE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MAJOR ARTICLE ON FONSEC CROSLAND'S VISIT APPEARED THE DAY OF HIS ARRIVAL.)

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11. MAROVIC WRITES IN NIN THAT FIVE PREVIOUS TITO-BREZHNEV MEETINGS AND NUMEROUS OTHER HIGH LEVEL AND SPECIALIST EXCHANGES CONFIRM THAT "COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS INDISPENSIBLE AND THE NEED FOR IT IS OF DURABLE NATURE." HE SAYS THAT SUMMIT MEETINGS "ARE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ELUCIDATING VAGUE POINTS, FOR EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES AND ADOPTING THEM AS AN INEVITABILITY, WHILE EXPLORING THE IDENTITY OF VIEWS FOR FURTHER MUTUALLY COOPERATIVE STEPS." HE TERMS THE BELGRADE DECLARATION OF 1955 "THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENT" FROM WHICH CONTENT THE SPIRIT "EMERGED ALSO ALL SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTS FROM TITO-BREZHNEV MEETINGS". ALL THESE DOCUMENTS "WILL SUCCESSFULLY OPEN THE DOOR TO COOPERATION BETWEEN" THE TWO "EVEN WHEN THE DIFFICULTIES, EMERGING OCCASIONALLY, SEEMED TO BE INSURMOUNTABLE." IN THIS RESPECT, HE MENTIONS A RECENT ARTICLE IN "NOVOE VREMYA" THAT STATED IT "IS INEVITABLE AND ABSOLUTELY NORMAL" THAT "THE EXPERIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALISM CANNOT BUT SPELL DISPUTES". MAROVIC'S TONE IS TO SAY THE LEAST TENTATIVE AND COOL.

12. IN THE MIDST OF RUMORS ABOUT A WITHDRAWAL BY TITO FROM ACTIVE POLITICS, HUNGARIAN COUNSELOR SAID TO POL COUNS THAT AS SOVIETS CONSIDER THIS MAY BE THEIR LAST MEETING WITH TITO THEY ATTACH SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO GETTING HIS STAMP OF APPROVAL ON COMMUNIQUE WHICH WILL SET IN CONCRETE FUTURE COURSE OF YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS AND COMMIT HIS SUCCESSORS. (AND YUGOSLAVS HAVE BEEN HEARD TO "JOKE" THAT BREZHNEV COMING HERE TO SIGN TITO'S LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT.)

13. IN PAST TWO WEEKS TITO'S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN BOLDLY CHRONICLED BY YUGOSLAV MEDIA, OBVIOUSLY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE OCTOGENERIC YUGOSLAV LEADER IS IN GOOD HEALTH. HIS ATTENDANCE AT A PRESIDENCY MEETING LAST WEEK, A TRIP TO BOSNIA-HERZOGOVINA AND RECEIVING THE FINNISH PARLIAMENTARY PRESIDENT RECEIVED PROLONGED COVERAGE MORE AS MEDIA EVENTS THAN FOR ANY SUBSTANCE. THE

RELATIONSHIP OF THIS TO THE BREZHNEV VISIT IS INDIRECT
BUT SHOWS THE YUGOSLAV PUBLIC THAT TITO IS WELL ENOUGH
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TO HANDLE HIS "YOUNGER" VISITOR.
SWEITZER

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Message Attributes

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